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Abstract
Assets, debts and other financial products issued by emerging countries are usually considered
more speculative than those issued by developed economies. Therefore, relying on traditional rating
agencies to invest in these countries is problematic as the information used to assess the economic
and market condition in these economies is quickly outdated. Consequently, both the investment
opportunities and the necessity to clear particular positions may be missed, respectively resulting in
potential significant costs of opportunity or losses. Therefore, an approach taking into account the
latest information displayed by financial markets may enable us bypassing the traditional limits. As
a result, this chapter proposes a creditworthiness evaluation methodology based on adjusting rat-
ings obtained from macroeconomic fundamentals (GDP growth rate, inflation, external debts, etc.)
and financial market movements (bonds, equity volume, volatility, etc.). In the first step, a general
panel model is applied on country-specific information to generate fundamental ratings. In the sec-
ond step, applying a multi-factor model to market indicators and breaking down long-term sovereign
bond yields into different risk premia, market implied ratings are obtained. Finally, the rating to
be considered (denoted “δ-Rating”) for investment purposes is a combination of fundamental ratings
and market implied ratings carrying out an adapted Bu¨hlmann-Straub method (Credibility Theory).
Then, emerging countries “δ-Rating” will be compared to those obtained from developed countries
and discussed against financial institutions risk appetite.
Key words: Credit Risk, Rating, Panel Model, Multi-factor regression, Credibility Theory
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1 Introduction
The term of emerging markets or emerging economies refers to the nations with social or business activity
in the process of rapid growth and industrialization. Within these class of economies, it is possible to
differentiate different families, as for sure Morroco and China do not have the same profile despite the
fact that they are both emerging countries. The seven largest emerging economies according to nominal
gross domestic product (GDP) are Brazil, Russia, India, China (the BRICs), Mexico, Indonesia, and
Turkey. S&P/IFC index1 considers a market to be emerging if it satisfies at least one of the criteria:
1. It is in a low- or middle- income country, as defined by the World Bank, and
2. Its investable market capitalization is low relative to its most recent GDP figures.
In contrast, S&P/IFC defines a market as developed if it is in a country where gross national product
(GNP) per capita exceeds the World Bank upper income threshold for at least three consecutive years
and the investable market capitalization-to-GDP ratio is in the top 25% of the emerging market universe
for more than three consecutive years.
Regarding the risks for investor, emerging markets are usually considered relatively riskier than developed
countries as they carry additional political, economical and currency risks. Investing in emerging markets
may lead to volatile returns, i.e. the probabilities of both large profits and large losses are high. The
upside of investing in emerging markets is that their performance is considered usually less correlated
with developed markets. As a result, these may be good investments for diversification purposes. Conse-
quently, nowadays developing countries are major investments targets, and these fast growing economies
are usually a growth relay for major banks. The second criterion highlights the fact that these economies
are growing so fast that the information characterizing them is rapidly outdated as their structure is
quickly evolving. Therefore, relying on the traditional rating agencies (e.g. Fitch, Moody’s and S&P’s)
to evaluate the risk of investing in these economies may be misleading, especially when the investment
horizon is short or medium term. Indeed, by not integrating the latest information contained in the
market, they may not provide the freshest point of views. It is important recalling that the rating is
suppose to reflect the credit worthiness of a country, i.e. its probability of default. The consideration of
fast growing economies allows us assuming that the related quickly growing cash flows generated decrease
the probability of default of these country on a constant basis.
Although there are papers doubting the quality of evaluations provided by rating agencies, investors keep
relying them. The problems of their evaluations have been largely unveiled during the East Asian Crisis
and the recent European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Regulators and market practitioners have acknowledged
the problems caused by external analysis, and as a consequence financial institutions developed internal
rating methodologies2. External ratings, however, are still used as benchmark or important input of
inside rating models. Possible explanations are that ratings provided by the major agencies are widely
spread, easy to understand, and as a result contribute to limit information bias. Moreover, discussions
concerning the problems of rating system and propositions of new rating methods in recent literature have
not reached any consensus. There are two school of thoughts: the first states that the credit of a country
is determined by its fundamental economic condition, therefore, ratings should rely on country-specific
fundamentals; the second argues that economic fundamentals are insufficient to model sovereign credit
risk and they propose to use market information.
In order to construct a rating methodology, the causal factors of sovereign default need to be analyzed,
and these are different from the determinants of corporate defaults (Duffie et al.(2003)[9]). The risk of
investing in a country is linked to its economic condition. Therefore, it is natural to start analyzing the
credit quality of a country using its fundamental indicators. Literatures discussing relationship between
country fundamentals and ratings include Cantor and Packer(1996)[6], Ferri et al.(1999)[12], Mellios and
1S&P using data acquired from International Finance Corporation, produces a number of capitalization weighted indexes
to measure emerging securities market including: S&P/IFCG (Global) Indexes and S&P/IFCI (Investable) Indexes
2Basel II/III: banks meeting certain conditions are allowed to use internal risk parameters calculating regulatory capital.
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Paget-Blanc(2006)[19], and many others. Cantor and Packer(1996)[6] have shown that Moody’s and
S&P’s ratings can be explained by a number of well-defined economic criteria. Ferri et al.(1999)[12] used
these indicators to compare the ratings pre- and post- East Asian crisis. They reached the conclusion that
rating agencies failed predicting the emergence of the East Asian crisis and attributed worse ratings than
what the countries’ fundamental economic condition deserved. They also argued that this undervaluation
amplified the East Asian crisis. To solve the problems engendered by the previous approach, Mellios and
Paget-Blanc(2006)[19] suggested to add other indicators, through which they emphasized the importance
of political variables. However, the second school of thoughts claims that sovereign risk cannot be fully
explained by country-specific fundamentals, especially for the risk in emerging market, as market opinions
may influence the perception of a country credit quality up to a certain extent. This argument partially
explains the inertia of agencies’ rating. It is generally accepted that markets react faster than agencies to
evaluate the credit worthiness of sovereigns. Hettenhouse and Sartoris(1976)[15] and Weinstein(1977)[23]
have shown that bond prices are systematically reacting to the signals implying a credit quality variation
before agencies modify the ratings. Ederington et al.(1984)[10] stated that market practitioners evaluate
issuer’s creditworthiness according to their expectations and the market risk perception, and these are
not considered by rating agencies. To capture market’s attitude towards sovereign risk, Cunningham et
al.(2001)[8] discussed the relationship between government bonds yield spreads and the corresponding
default risks on emerging market, where they claimed that information contained in yield spreads are
multi-faceted. They mentioned the importance of investors’ appetite for risk evaluation and the value
of liquidity for specific instruments. Perraudin and Taylor(2004)[22] have shown that sovereign bond
valuations are inconsistent with their ratings. They claimed that the inconsistency can be eliminated
by adjusting the prices for the effects of taxes, liquidity and other risk premiums. They also proved the
inconsistencies between ratings and spreads are naturally eliminated over time. Mainstream discussions
concerning market evaluated sovereign risk focus on detecting determinants of risk proxy from market,
such as bond yields and credit default swaps. Baek et al.(2005)[2] claimed that risk appetite can explain
the movement of bond yields. They further proved that investors’ risk attitude was not considered in
public ratings. Longstaff et al.(2011)[18] decomposed credit spreads into several risk premiums. They
found that sovereign credit risk was more driven by market factors, risk premiums and investment flows
than by country-specific fundamentals. Moreover, they found strong relationship between credit spreads
and VIX index. In summary, movements of market indicators are closely related to agencies’ ratings,
but ratings issued by agencies are not consistent with investors’ perceptions as fundamental indicators
cannot fully explain the part of sovereign risk nested in market sentiments.
Therefore, this chapter presents a methodology to combine information obtained from macroeconomic
indicator (fundamental rating) on the first hand and financial market (market implied rating) on the
other hand in order to construct a rating reflecting both the targeted state’s economic health and the
global market evaluation of the sovereign’s creditworthiness. This approach is referred as the δ-rating
approach in the following. By means of this hybrid approach, it is possible to offer more timeless ratings
compared to agencies’ valuations and provide prompt signals for investment opportunities or necessity to
sell. Therefore, this approach enables improving the investment strategy in emerging countries as being
a more reality and reactive methodology comparing to the traditional approach.
To create the δ-ratings, three steps are required. In a first step, country-specific fundamental information
is modeled using a general panel model to obtain a basic long-term country-specific implied rating. In
a second step, a multi-factor model is applied to decompose bond yields into different risk premiums.
Then, market implied ratings are computed from the stripped credit risk premium. In a final step, the
δ-rating is evaluated applying a simplified version of the Bu¨hlmann-Straub credibility theory (Bu¨hlmann
and Alois (2005)[5]) which may be summarized by the following formula:
δ-Rating = ω · Fundamental Rating + (1− ω) ·Market Implied Rating,
where, ω is the credibility weight calculated by Bu¨hlmann-Straub method.
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This chapter proposes a method which systematically matches low-frequency macroeconomic data with
high-frequency financial market data in the modeling of sovereign rating, it analyzes how market demands
and risk appetite affect market implied rating, and their impact on financial institutions’ investments in
developing countries3. The novelty of our hybrid methodology stands in the combination information
from data having different frequencies. Therefore, the next section introduces the methodology, the third
section presents our results and a last section concludes.
2 The δ-rating methodology
This section details how a fundamental rating and a market implied rating are combined. In a first
step, the next subsections present the methodologies carried out to evaluate each component. The third
subsection outlines the credibility theory approach used to bring together the two elements.
2.1 Country-Specific Fundamental Rating
Sovereign credit risk can be captured by a relative small number of economic variables. These do not
dramatically differ among studies (Cantor and Packer(1996)[6], Ferri et al.(1999)[12], Mellios and Paget-
Blanc(2006)[19], etc.). Table 1 summarizes these macroeconomic variables.
Variable Corr.* Economic Principal Literature
Per capita income +
Cantor and Packer (1996)
The increase of the per capita income implies Ferri et al. (1999)
1
a larger tax base and stronger ability to Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)
honor the debt obligation. Ga¨rtner et al. (2011)
GDP growth rate +
Cantor and Packer (1996)
The higher growth rate of GDP indicates a Ferri et al. (1999)
better ability of the country to facing their Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)
debt burden. Ga¨rtner et al. (2011)
Inflation -
Cantor and Packer (1996)
High inflation rate indicates government Ferri et al. (1999)
financial structure problem and low Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)
creditworthiness. Ga¨rtner et al. (2011)
Fiscal balance +
Fiscal surplus indicates the government has the Cantor and Packer (1996)
financial capacity to pay their debts. Fiscal Ferri et al. (1999)
2
deficit indicates less capital to pay the debts. Ga¨rtner et al. (2011)
External debt -
Cantor and Packer (1996)
The higher external debt causes higher Ferri et al. (1999)
intensive to default and lower creditworthiness. Ga¨rtner et al. (2011)
Economic development +
Cantor and Packer (1996)
Industrialized or developed countries have higher Ferri et al. (1999)
3
creditworthiness than the developing countries. Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)
Default History -
Defaulting sovereigns suffer a severe Ozler(1991)
decline in their reputation with creditors. Cantor and Packer (1996)
Current Account Balances
+
The larger current account indicates the more Cantor and Packer (1996)
4
sufficient capital to pay the debt. A persistent Ferri et al. (1999)
(CAB) deficit indicates the poor creditworthiness. Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)
Corruption Index +
Higher index indicate less corruption Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)
and better policy operation. Michaelides et al. (2012)
Table 1: Fundamental Explanatory Variables introduced in Literature
1
Ferri et al. (1999) use the notation of GDP per capita instead of fiscal Per capital income.
2
Ferri et al. (1999) use the notation of budget deficit instead of fiscal balance.
3
Ferri et al. (1999) use the notation of development indicator instead of economic development.
4
Cantor and Packer (1996) use the notation external balance refer to the current account deficit.
*
“Corr.” refers to the correlation between the variable and the creditworthiness of the government. “+” means the bigger the
variable the higher the credit. “-” means the lower the variable the higher the credit.
**
The literature are not the complete review, we only give relevant references.
3Our empirical analysis covers an extent range of countries and time period which includes the peaks of recent crisis.
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Nonetheless, the model used to analyze these variables varies among the studies. Cantor and Packer
(1996)[6] tested the variables with cross-sectional data4. Ferri et al.(1999)[12] applied panel data5 and
did regression analysis with random effect. Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)[19] used a principal component
analysis (PCA) method, a linear regression and an ordered logistic modeling to analyze the indicators.
The relationship between explanatory variables and historical ratings on a special day is not the focal point
of this paper, whereas we are interested in the explanatory power of fundamental economic indicators
during a relative long period, and panel analysis is more appropriate for this purpose. Therefore, a
general panel model is applied to regress fundamental economic indicators on the numerical mappings of
agencies’ historical rating, which can be expressed by equation (1).
St = α0 + β
′
1 ·Xt + ′t (1)
where α0 is an intercept vector, β1 is the coefficients of explanatory variables, t is a white noise residual,
and Xt is a matrix of economic indicators listed in Table 1. St represents the rating of each sovereign.
Parameters and vectors are real numbers. The techniques of analysis used in the empirical study include
PCA and panel regression methods. To explore the fittest regression method of equation (1), the pooling
regression has been tested against random and cross-sectional effects using Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
Multiplier Test(Breusch and Pagan (1980)[4]). Fixed effect against random effect of the selected data
will be analyzed using the Hausman Test(Hausman (1978)[14]). The time-fixed effect are tested using
both the F-test and the serial correlation using Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test(Godfrey (1996)[16]).
2.2 Market Implied Rating
In this study, government bond yields are used as a representation of market perceptions of the risk.
Government bonds are a publicly traded financial product. Their prices are related to a government’s
creditworthiness. Though many papers use credit default swap (CDS) as the proxy of credit risk, these
are less resourceful data of CDS than bonds, especially for emerging countries. Secondly, sovereign bond
spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions than CDS, therefore they provide a better representation of
sovereign risk (Badaoui et al.(2012)[1]). Moreover as highlighted by Hull et al.(2004)[17] bond yield and
CDS contain almost the same information, government bond yield is a good proxy of sovereign risk.
Generally, the higher the rating of a sovereign, the lower the bond yields, and vice versa, therefore, bond
yields movements can reflect the shift of market attitude towards credit quality of a sovereign. On the
other hand, the movements are influenced by other factors than only government repayment capability.
When an investor lends money to a government by buying bonds, he exposes himself to many risks,
such as credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk. Perraudin and Taylor(2004)[22] have shown that the
inconsistencies6 between credit ratings and corporate bond yields come from non-credit-related factors
of spreads such as tax, liquidity and other risk premia. Ejsing et al.(2012)[11] discussed liquidity and
credit premia for the Euro Zone sovereign bonds. Bonds are traded in the secondary market which simul-
taneously reflect the market risk perception and deliver timeless information to evaluate the credit risk.
Agencies, however, evaluate countries’ credit quality on a frequency from quarterly to annually. Hence,
some discordances are observed between agencies’ ratings and bond yields primarily. Rating agencies
advocate that they provide less precise point-in-time measures of risk since the ratings reflect the credit
quality in the long term. However, and despite the fact that the previous statement is questionable,
market practitioners may be more interested in a short to medium term investments. The inconsistence
comes from non-credit reasons rather than only horizon difference.
To improve the analysis, a multi-factor approach is carried out. It is commonly accepted in the literature
that credit spreads can be expressed as a linear combination of default-related components and other
associated risk premiums (Longstaff and Pedersen(2011)[18], Collin-Dufresne et al.(2001)[7], Beber et
al.(2009)[3], etc.). Accordingly, the non-credit-reasons are considered as liquidity risk premium, market
4Data of forty-nine countries at September 29, 1995
510 years time period (1989-1998) data of seventeen countries
6The term “inconsistencies” refers to the disordered ordering classification of average price of bond according to ratings.
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demands and investors’ risk appetite. Then, yield spreads are decomposed into credit, liquidity, market
demand premia and risk appetite using a multi-factor model:
yi,t = ai,0 + ai,1Li,t + ai,2MPi,t + ai,3RAi,t + εt (2)
where yi,t refers to yield spreads of bond i at time t, ai,0 represents the averaged credit risk premium, Li,t
is the sign of liquidity risk and MPi,t represents the market demand of government bonds and denotes
the market appetite, RAi,t measures investors’ risk appetite, and εt is a standard white noise which is
independent from other explanatory variables. Proxies of each indicator in equation (2) are as follow:
1. Bid-ask spreads for liquidity risk,
2. FTSE-Index for the market demand of government bonds
3. Implied volatility of S&P 500 index options (VIX) for the global risk aversion.
2.3 Credible Weights
The “δ-Rating” is obtained through the average of fundamental ratings and market implied ratings using
the credibility weight ω. Bu¨hlmann-Straub method7, the most extensively used and important model in
credibility theory, is applied to compute the weight ω (Bu¨hlmann and Alois(2005)[5]).
Theorem 1 (Bu¨hlmann-Straub). The credibility estimator µ in the simple Bu¨hlmann-Straub model:
A.1 The random variables Xkj (j = 1, . . . , n) are, conditional on Θk = ϑ, independent with the same
distribution function Fϑ and conditional moments
µ(ϑ) = E[Xkj |Θk = ϑ],
σ2(ϑ) = V ar[Xkj |Θk = ϑ].
A.2 The pairs (Θ1, X1), . . ., (ΘK , XK) are independent and identically distributed.
is given by
µ = ωXi + (1− ω)X (3)
where
ω =
n
n+ σ
2
τ2
, σ2 = E[σ2(Θ)], τ2 = V ar(µ(Θ)). (4)
Xi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Xi,j X =
1
Kn
K∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Xij
Practically, in our case, Xj is the rating implied by the specific market information and X is the long-term
fundamental rating estimated through country-specific economic data. Moreover ω is the weight given
to market implied rating and lead to the ”δ−rating”, as it is the weighted average of the two previous
components.
3 Rating Evaluation: Carrying out the methodology
3.1 Country-Specific Implied Rating
The data used to estimate country-specific rating has annual frequency and belong to the period between
2001 and 2012. Historical rating scores are derived from Fitch Sovereign HistoricalRatings8 using the
mapping exhibited in Table 14. Economic indicators, except for the “corruption index”, are collected
from the International Money Fund (IMF) WEO Database. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has been
obtained from Transparency International9. The sample includes 20 advanced countries and 8 emerging
7This approach is also called empirical Bayesian method
8http://www.fitchratings.com/web content/ratings/sovereign ratings history.xls. The annual minimum ratings have
been used when there were multiple rating assignments during one year.
9Transparency International (2010) Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. Retrieved 24 Aug 2011
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countries, according to the IMF classification10.
Statistics of data are presented in Table 8. The rating of advanced economies are higher than emerging
economies’. Advanced economies usually have smaller GPD growth rate, larger external debts, higher
per capita income, lower inflation rates, greater fiscal balance, better current account balance and higher
corruption perceptions index than emerging economies.
In a first step, the multicollinearity and the correlation of the indicators with the ratings have been
analyzed. There is no sufficient evidence supporting a linear relationship between indicators (Figure 1).
Moreover, the value of correlations and variance inflation factors (VIF) presented in Table 6 shows that
there is no significant multicollinearity. The cumulative explanatory proposition of indicators are given in
Table 7 and computed implementing a principal component analysis. The results indicate that the first
seven components can explain up to 99% of the information. The fittest regression method of equation
(1) is obtained using the tests introduced in section 2. The tests are implemented on both subgroups
of countries and the whole data set. Results are presented in Table 9. The p-values of Breusch-Pagan
and Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge tests indicate that there are cross-sectional dependencies and serial
correlations in the advanced economies data set, emerging economies data sets and the whole sample,
therefore an OLS regression is not reliable. This is confirmed by using a F-statistic to test fixed effects
against the OLS, and Breusch-Pagan LM test of the random effects against the OLS. The p-values of
Hausman tests reveal that a fixed effect model is more appropriate. The p-values of the F -tests reject
time-fixed effect. Thus, the fixed-effect approach is the best regression method for fundamental rating
model (equation 1). The results are presented in Table 2.
External debt (ED) and current account balance (CAB) are significant factors and exhibit negative effects
considering advanced economies, emerging economies and the whole data set. The negative effect of ED
is consistent with the discussion in Section 2. Indeed, higher external debt causes higher debt burden and
leads to lower creditworthiness. A possible explanation of negative CAB is that domestic investments
are financed by foreigners’ savings, and this implies a higher confidence in sovereigns’ creditworthiness.
Although the averaged CAB of advanced countries is higher than of emerging economies, the regression
results suggest that the CAB indicator alone is not sufficient to characterize a country credit quality.
Secondly, the inflation rate (denoted as Inf.) factor is significant for both the whole sample and the
emerging economies subsample. It has a negative sign, as a high inflation rate is a negative indicator for
the economic development of a country. Investing in countries where the inflation rate is uncontrolled
is highly risky. Nevertheless, the causal factor of inflation is ambiguous, especially for the developed
countries. It could be the result of a monetary policy aiming at improving the economic condition of
a country rather than deteriorating it. However, GDP growth rate, fiscal balance (FB) and Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) factors are not statistically significant. As a result, the GDP growth rate is not
a suitable explanatory variable for rating scores, although it is an important index to characterize the
development speed of a country. This result is not entirely counter intuitive as reviewing international
GDP growth rate during 2012, we observed that most countries with high GDP growth rate, such as
Qatar, Ghana, Turkmenistan, etc., are countries with poor credit quality. On the contrary, countries
with good ratings, such as Germany, Finland or Canada, have GDP growth rate under the world average.
However, sovereigns with negative growth rate (recession) such as Sudan, Andorra, Syria, etc., are very
10Though there are plenty of macroeconomic data available for a larger number of countries, it is difficult to collect the
market information for the same group of countries. The sample used in this part of analysis is in line with the sample used
for the market implied rating. Thus, whether a country is selected in our sample depends on the limit of our access to its
pertaining market indicators. Therefore, some interested candidates, such as Greece, China and Argentine are missing.
8
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All Countries Advanced Countries Emerging Countries
Estimate Pr(>|t|) Estimate Pr(>|t|) Estimate Pr(>|t|)
GDP 0.13 0.24 0.04 0.74 0.11 0.52
(0.11) (0.13) (0.17)
PCI 4.84e-05 0.09. 1.64e-05 0.56 1.68e-04 0.43
(2.89e-05) (2.83e-05) (2.12e-04)
Inf. -0.68 1.15e-05*** -0.12 0.65 -0.69 8.02e-04***
(0.15) (0.27) (0.20)
FB 0.04 0.80 -0.25 0.23 0.42 0.19
(0.17) (0.21) (0.32)
ED -0.26 <2.2e-16*** -0.19 1.60e-09*** -0.47 4.79e-12***
(0.03) (0.03) 5.77e-02
CAB -0.55 3.79e-07*** -0.35 6.64e-04** -0.80 1.02e-04***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.20)
CPI 0.89 0.25 1.46 0.12 0.16 0.91
(0.78) (0.93) (1.44)
Australia 91.88 <2.2e-16*** 96.85 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.33) (11.29)
Austria 108.30 <2.2e-16*** 113.14 <2.2e-16*** – –
(10.99) (13.28)
Belgium 108.12 <2.2e-16*** 111.55 <2.2e-16*** – –
(10.85) (13.08)
Brazil 62.10 <2.2e-16*** – – 65.17 5.86e-08***
(7.18) (12.02)
Canada 109.67 <2.2e-16*** 111.21 <2.2e-16*** – –
(10.33) (12.48)
Czech Republic 81.59 <2.2e-16*** 88.53 <2.2e-16*** – –
(7.94) (9.55)
Denmark 102.39 <2.2e-16*** 109.44 3.670e-13*** – –
(12.45) (15.06)
Finland 101.38 <2.2e-16*** 108.13 2.058e-13*** – –
(12.18) (14.72)
France 108.52 <2.2e-16*** 114.61 <2.2e-16*** – –
(10.70) (12.91)
Germany 110.85 <2.2e-16*** 113.83 <2.2e-16*** – –
(10.32) (12.46)
Hungary 80.50 <2.2e-16*** – – 79.34 1.659e-07***
(9.00) (15.16)
India 71.96 <2.2e-16*** – – 83.10 <2.2e-16***
(4.89) (8.09)
Italy 108.50 <2.2e-16*** 111.34 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.52) (11.40)
Netherlands 107.02 <2.2e-16*** 110.32 <2.2e-16*** – –
(10.91) (13.18)
New Zealand 101.96 <2.2e-16 *** 95.95 <2.2e-16*** – –
(17.96) (11.47)
Norway 93.2745 <2.2e-16*** 114.43 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.48) (15.21)
Philippines 65.57 <2.2e-16*** – – 72.25 <2.2e-16***
(4.18) (6.77)
Poland 81.70 <2.2e-16*** – – 78.41 2.414e-09 ***
(7.82) (13.14)
Portugal 89.25 <2.2e-16*** 93.51 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.15) (11.03)
Russia 67.29 <2.2e-16*** – – 60.10 8.367e-08 ***
(7.05) (11.22)
Singapore 125.25 <2.2e-16*** 116.22 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.19) (10.93)
South Africa 76.78 <2.2e-16*** – – 77.42 2.953e-14***
(6.14) (10.10)
Spain 96.94 <2.2e-16*** 101.18 <2.2e-16*** – –
(8.75) (10.57)
Sweden 103.56 <2.2e-16*** 109.52 2.864e-14*** – –
(11.92) (14.40)
Switzerland 109.64 < 2.2e-16*** 110.26 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.94) (11.95)
Thailand 81.23 <2.2e-16*** – – 85.87 <2.2e-16***
(4.95) (8.09)
United Kingdom 103.30 <2.2e-16*** 106.17 <2.2e-16*** – –
(9.51) (11.50)
United States 108.33 <2.2e-16*** 109.34 <2.2e-16*** – –
(8.73) (10.54)
R-Square 0.37725 0.25517 0.68366
Adj. R-Square 0.33795 0.22646 0.57684
The regression is implemented with the data set of all countries, advanced countries and emerging countries respectively. In this
table, the coefficient estimate of the corresponding variable is provided in the column labeled ”Estimate” along their standard
errors in brackets. The p-values are given on the right of each estimate. The symbols “***”, “**”, “*” and “.” refer to the
significance level 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1.
Table 2: Fix-Effect Regression Results for Country-Specific Model
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risky investment choices, as these countries are not creating any value. Consequently, the influence of
GDP growth rate on a country credit quality is not linearly related. Though these high scored countries
generally have high and positive FB, the difference is not significant in our sample. Regarding the CPI,
contrary to the results obtained by Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006)[19], this factor is positively significant
for the whole sample at a 90% confidence level. Our results indicate that the PCI factor is appropriate
to explain the rating scores if the countries are not split in different subsets. Finally, R2 and Adjusted
R2 lie between 0.23 and 0.68 for the estimation of equation (1) on the three data sets. Moreover, R2
and adjusted11 R2 cannot be improved by changing regression methods. It indicates that using these
indicators cannot fully explain the ratings issued by agencies during the recent 10 years. These statistics
suggest that during the selected time period some macroeconomic indicators which were explanatory
variables in previous analysis cannot explain the rating in ours. This intermediate conclusion should be
related to the fact that our analysis is performed during a global downturn and this affects the data. But
this support the paper’s objective of adjusting this fundamental rating using the market information.
3.2 Market Implied Rating
The data used in market implied rating analysis characterized by (2) include bond yields, bid-ask spreads
of bond, FTSE-Global Index, and VIX index. These contain the market related information of 20 ad-
vanced countries and 8 emerging countries and start from 01/01/2001 to 30/09/2012 on a daily basis.
Concretely, the government benchmark bond index provided by Reuters EcoWin with a 10 years matu-
rity, along their local currencies are used to capture bond yields movements. The two main advantages
of using this index than computing the term structure of a specific bond are the following. Firstly, it is
much easier to match other market indicators with the selected bond yields. Secondly, this bond index
is a reference to which investors benchmark the performance of individual market sectors as it is neither
polluted by coupons nor taxes. Most bond yield indexes are provided by Reuters EcoWin, however, for
some emerging economies, the data have been obtained from Datastream. The bid-ask spreads of bonds
have been obtained from Bloomberg. The FTSE-Global Index for each sovereign provided by Reuters
EcoWin is used as a proxy for the variation of market demands. VIX indexes obtained from Datastream
is used as a measure of the market risk appetite.
Statistics of government benchmark bond index of the selected sovereigns with 10-years maturity are
given in Table 10. To facilitate the comparison, a dichotomic approach has been undertaken, splitting
advanced and emerging countries into two sub-groups. In average, higher rating leads to lower yields.
Consequently, means of high rated sovereigns’ bond yields are generally lower than means of those from
low rated governments, however, the watershed is not clearly identified. There are intersections of the
averaged yields between the high and low rated sovereigns’ bond yields. For example, average yields of
Thailand who has the highest rating of A/Stable is lower than the mean yields of Australia who are rated
AAA/Stable in the period of analysis. Moreover, among the high rated bonds, the movements are not
uniform. Figure 2 represents the time series of the government benchmark bond yields of eleven countries
whose ratings remained AAA/Stable during the considered period. Although, they hold the same rating
during the same period, the movements and ranges of their yields were varying. Switzerland bonds moved
relatively smoothly during the observed period, however, on the same period Norway’s government bonds
fluctuations were significant. Moreover, all bond yields show clear upward movements from 2007 to 2009
except for Canada. Figure 3 exhibits the remaining nine advanced economies’ government bond yields.
These nine time series show more divers features, since their ratings were varying during this period.
Portugal government bond yields experienced the most prominent increase during the last two years. An
identical phenomenon has been observed for the government bonds of Belgium, Italy and Spain. However,
these countries have been dramatically impacted by resent European Sovereign Debt Crisis (Movements
of emerging countries’ bond yields are plotted in Figure 4). Though there is no tendency for these bond
yields behaviors, they are more volatile than those of advanced economies.
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) of the same period is presented in Figure 5.
Statistics of bid-ask spread of bonds and market capitalizations of FTSE-Global Equity Index are given
11Here we assume the linear relation among the variables as model 1
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in Table 11. Statistics of these two market indicators are presented in two groups following the country’s
economic development level. Italian, Portugese and Spanish bonds are relatively more liquid than others
among the advanced economies. Meanwhile, the Hungarian, Philippians and Polish bonds are more liquid
compared to others emerging countries. The interesting observation in the results presented in the Tables
Estimates
Std.Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
(Coefficients)
Ask-Bid Spread -1.5303 0.0098 -155.5998 < 2.20E − 16 ***
FTSE Maket Cap. -0.0006 0.0001 -7.9346 2.15E-15 ***
VIX 0.0018 0.0004 4.8693 1.12E-06 ***
Estimates
Std.Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
(Credit Risk Premiums)
Australia 5.5258 0.0183 301.8760 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Austria 3.9067 0.0173 226.4240 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Belgium 3.9839 0.0173 230.1640 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Canada 4.1206 0.0186 221.4800 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Czech 4.3676 0.0172 253.2900 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Denmark 3.9283 0.0173 226.6980 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Finland 3.8605 0.0173 222.5650 < 2.20E − 16 ***
France 3.9276 0.0196 200.7410 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Germany 3.7990 0.0187 203.4140 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Italy 4.1761 0.0179 233.5370 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Netherland 3.8647 0.0177 218.3950 < 2.20E − 16 ***
New Zealand 5.8735 0.0173 340.2560 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Norway 4.5459 0.0173 262.0960 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Portugal 4.4751 0.0182 246.5230 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Singapore 2.7923 0.0173 160.9860 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Spain 4.1114 0.0179 229.8260 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Sweden 3.7717 0.0175 215.3550 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Switzerland 2.5913 0.0185 139.7220 < 2.20E − 16 ***
United Kingdom 4.3938 0.0251 175.2200 < 2.20E − 16 ***
United States 4.6549 0.0867 53.6620 < 2.20E − 16 ***
R-Squared: 0.2849 Adj R-Squared: 0.2848
This table presents the result of the regression of the market implied rating model with the data of 20 advanced economies.
Credit risk premia of each country are given in the second column. *** refers significant level 0.001.
Table 3: Fixed-Effect Regression Results of Market-Implied Rating Model of Advanced Economies
Estimates
Std.Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
(Coefficients)
Ask-Bid Spread 2.8778 0.0686 41.9800 < 2.20E − 16 ***
FTSE Maket Cap. -0.1210 0.0011 -107.7100 < 2.20E − 16 ***
VIX 0.0344 0.0013 27.1910 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Estimates
Std.Error t-value Pr(> |t|)
(Credit Risk Premiums)
Brazil 9.7298 0.0628 154.8320 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Hungary 6.7608 0.0692 97.6460 < 2.20E − 16 ***
India 7.5942 0.0457 166.2740 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Philippines 9.1144 0.0492 185.4130 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Poland 6.0675 0.0428 141.8240 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Russia 9.2199 0.0501 184.1090 < 2.20E − 16 ***
South Africa 10.8099 0.0484 223.4070 < 2.20E − 16 ***
Thailand 4.1275 0.0429 96.1070 < 2.20E − 16 ***
R-Squared: 0.3505 Adj. R-Squared: 0.3503
This table presents the results obtained from the regression of the market implied rating model with the data of 8 emerging
economies. Credit risk premia of each country are given in the second column. *** refers significant level 0.001.
Table 4: Fixed-Effect Regression Results of Market-Implied Rating Model of Emerging Economies
3 and 4, is that the liquidity have different impact on the ratings depending on the group the country
belongs to. The results show that liquid bonds issued by advanced economies, i.e. characterized by low
bid-ask spreads, bear lower yields. This result is consistent with the fact that the more liquid the asset,
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the lower the transaction costs, the lower the risk, and consequently the lower the return. However, a
negative bid-ask spreads has been observed in the result of the regression regarding emerging economies. A
possible interpretation of this result is that the liquidity factor for emerging market12 works in a different
way than for the intuitive approach. When investing in emerging markets, which are relatively riskier
than advanced markets, investors may hold more active and sensitive investment strategies than investing
in advanced economies. Therefore, even though investors prefer to choose more liquid bonds, they are
more sensitive to losses than in advanced market such that they actively trade the bonds. Active trading
contributes to a higher liquidity and the yields generated by these bonds are not necessarily very high.
Secondly, the market requirement indicator (FTSE-Global Market Capitalization Index) is significant in
both regressions with negative signs. This indicates that when investors are willing to invest but are
”disappointed” by equity markets, they turn to other markets such as the bonds. Similarly, investors will
leave bond market if it becomes depressed. The p-values of the t-tests confirm that this indicator has a
significant influence for the bond yields. While, comparing coefficients of the FTSE Market Cap. in the
two regressions, we observe that the influence of market requirements is more significant for the emerging
economies than for advanced markets. Finally, the VIX index which measures the risk appetite of market
practitioners has a significant positive coefficient in both regressions. This is consistent with the fact that
investors tend to be more conservative when the markets are turbulent, i.e. they tend to demand higher
returns for the same level of risk under a volatile market than under bullish market conditions. Moreover,
the influence of this indicator is stronger for emerging markets than for advanced economies, as people
have usually more confidence in advanced economies during crisis (e.g. ”fly to quality” behaviors).
3.3 Implied Ratings and Credibility Weights
Here, we give the two implied ratings and the δ−ratings in the standard alphabets fashion so that to
compare the results with agency’s ratings. Country-specific implied rating and market implied rating are
derived from previous results listed in Table 2, 3 and 4. The two ratings are both calculated from an
ordinal scale method13 with the inputs of the previous obtained implied credit premium. The outcomes
are credit scores showed in the first two columns of Table 13. Credibility weights, i.e. ω in equation 4,
are listed in the fifth column of Table 1314. Alphabets given in Table 5 are the scaled results according
to the mapping given in Table 14.
Firstly, fundamental ratings listed in the second column of Table 5 are compared with Fitch’s ratings,
the last column. Rating agencies tend to rate the advanced countries higher than what is implied by
the related economic data, except for the countries affected by crisis like Belgium, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. However, this optimistic attitude is not observed evaluating the ratings of emerging countries.
Emerging countries with higher agency’s ratings than fundamental ratings are usually believed to have
good economic perspectives, while those with higher fundamental ratings than agency’s ratings usually
recently experienced an economic turmoil.
Secondly, we compared market implied ratings and agency’s ratings (third and last column in Table
5). Similarly, Fitch gave better ratings to advanced economies than the ratings implied by their market
indicators except for the countries believed in trouble, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. However, this
tendency is not particularly clear in the emerging group. Comparing fundamental and market implied
ratings, we found that market implied ratings are lower than their fundamental ratings for advanced
economies, except for Czech Republic, Portugal and Switzerland. For emerging economies, however,
market implied ratings are higher than country-specific implied ratings except for India and South Africa.
Credibility weights are given in Table 13, applying the algorithm expressed in equation (4) and the
bootstrapping results of E(σ2). Market implied ratings bear lower weights for the states with stable
ratings through years and higher weights for the countries with volatile ratings. The δ−rating provided
12Or the emerging markets in our sample.
13The scales are different since the difference of models of the two ratings. We separate the two economies groups to
compute market implied ratings since the different sign of liquidity. Credit rankings are given in Table 12.
14The value of σ2 are calculated by bootstrapping.
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in the fourth column, are obtained using the credibility weights between the fundamental ratings and
the market implied ratings. Comparing the δ−ratings and Fitch’s ratings, we observe that the adjusted
ratings are usually lower than agency’s ratings for advanced economies, but they exhibit different aspects
whether the countries are facing financial or economic trouble. This phenomenon indicates that rating
agencies may overreact to these countries problems than what their economic and financial indicators
imply. For emerging countries, rating agencies give higher ratings to the countries which are believed
having better economic perspectives than the averaged ratings we proposed and lower ratings to these
countries facing or under economic or financial difficulties. Therefore, we believe ratings agencies are
driven by public belief or mass media and partially lose their objectivity. Combining the two implied
ratings using credibility weights enables assessing the underlying credit risk of the sovereign.
Country Country-Specific Rating Market Implied Rating δ−Rating Fitch’s Rating
Australia AA- Watch Negative A+ Watch Positive AA- Watch Negative AAA Stable
Austria AA+ Watch Positive AA- Watch Positive AA+ Watch Positive AAA Stable
Belgium AA+ Positive AA- Watch Positive AA+ Positive AA Negative
Canada AA+ Positive AA- Positive AA+ Stable AAA Stable
Czech A Positive AA- Negative A Positive AA- Stable
Denmark AA+ Negative AA- Watch Positive AA+ Negative AAA Stable
Finland AA+ Watch Negative AA- Watch Positive AA+ Watch Negative AAA Stable
France AAA Negative AA- Watch Positive AAA Watch Negative AAA Negative
Germany AAA Watch Negative AA Negative AAA Watch Negative AAA Stable
Italy AA+ Positive AA- Stable AA Stable A- Negative
Netherlands AA+ Stable AA- Watch Positive AA+ Stable AAA Stable
New Zealand AA- Watch Negative A+ Positive A+ Watch Positive AA+ Stable
Norway AAA Watch Negative AA- Watch Negative AA+ Watch Positive AAA Stable
Portugal A+ Stable AA- Negative AA- Watch Negative BB+ Negative
Singapore AAA Stable AAA Negative AAA Stable AAA Stable
Spain AA- Watch Positive AA- Positive AA- Positive BBB Negative
Sweden AA+ Negative AA Negative AA+ Negative AAA Stable
Switzerland AA+ Stable AAA Stable AA+ Stable AAA Stable
UK AA Positive AA- Negative AA Positive AAA Negative
US AA+ Negative AA- Watch Negative AA+ Watch Negative AAA Negative
Brazil BBB- Positive BBB Watch Positive BBB- Positive BBB Stable
Hungary A- Watch Negative A- Stable A- Negative BBB- Negative
India A- Watch Positive BBB+ Watch Positive A- Negative BBB- Negative
Philippines BBB- Watch Positive BBB+ Negative BBB- Watch Positive BBB- Stable
Poland BBB+ Watch Positive A Watch Negative A- Watch Negative A Stable
Russia BB+ Watch Positive BBB+ Watch Negative BB+ Watch Positive BBB Stable
South Africa BBB+ Positive BBB Positive BBB+ Stable A Negative
Thailand A Negative AA- Positive A Positive A- Stable
*This table compares the ratings obtained from the different sources. In the first two columns, the country-specific ratings and
the market implied ratings of both the 20 advanced economies and the 8 emerging economies are provided using the regression
results obtained in the previous section. The weighted averaged ratings obtained using the credibility theory are listed in the
third column. The fitch’s history rating is given at the last column.
Table 5: Fundament Implied Rating, Market Implied Rating, Adjusted Rating and Agency Rating
4 Discussion and Conclusion
As investment opportunities become more global and diverse, it is important to decide which countries
represent good investment opportunities. There are advantages to invest in foreign markets, but the risks
associated may be considerably higher when investing in emerging economies. To secure the advantage of
foreign investment, investors should ensure that the return generated is sufficient to offset the risk they
are taking. Measuring the ability of a country to face its financial commitments, i.e. its debts, ratings are
essential tools to support investment decisions. Traditional ratings are issued by credit rating agencies
(CRAs) which are painfully recovering their credibility after the crisis. The recent remedial regulations
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Code of Conduct for CRAs15 cannot solve the problems completely.
Hence, it is necessary to challenge CRAs’ fundamental methodologies. In this paper, we proposed an
hybrid method using public information to evaluate sovereign’s credit. We find several interesting results
supporting the idea that investors should rethink the credibility or the objectivity of the ratings issued
by CRAs.
15The code published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions
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Firstly, some macroeconomic indicators which have proved to be useful (indeed used by CRAs in their
quantitative models) do not really explain the ratings issued by them nowadays. As mentioned above,
ratings are a combination of quantitative and qualitative evaluation approach, but the results of country-
specific implied rating in section 3.1 tend to show that agencies’ models tend to improve the ratings of
advanced economies and lower the ratings of emerging economies. While, it is interesting to notice that
there are three exceptions, Italy, Portugal and Spain, who have the agencies’ ratings lower than both
their country-specific ratings and market implied ratings. This finding confirms the belief that CRAs
tend to become more conservative during the crisis and by the way, may adopt a pro-cyclical attitude
toward these economies. This attitude justifying the need of alternative approach. Indeed, they tend
to give conservative ratings to the countries who are “believed” in trouble even though both economic
indicators and market perceptions do not acknowledge them. On the other hand, fundamental rating
obtained in our study offers investors an overview of sovereigns credit risk implied by their economic
profile. Therefore, an investor holding a long-term investment project may rely more on the fundamental
ratings in order to screen the subjective biases released in agencies’ ratings.
Secondly, market implied ratings are generally lower than country-specific implied ratings for advanced
economies, but higher than the corresponding fundamental ratings for emerging markets. This finding
indicates that market has different opinion concerning the difference of credibility between developed and
developing sovereigns. Besides, the influence of bond liquidity exhibits different roles in advanced and
emerging economies. This outcome suggests that in practice, investors use different trading strategies
for emerging markets than for developed economies, since these markets work in another way than the
traditional ones. This finding shows that investors who are attracted by the advantages of investing in
emerging countries should consider alternative trading strategies than traditional developed markets’.
Therefore, investors having a more complex business model should pay more attention to the market
implied ratings approach which allows quicker updates regarding the tendency of the uncertain markets.
Moreover, the overvalued risk of investing in emerging countries according to CRAs’ ratings may offer
arbitrage opportunity to short-term oriented investors.
Additionally, the δ−rating approach proposed in this paper gives a weighted average of the long-term
fundamental ratings and the updated market implied ratings through credibility weight. We believe the
δ−rating can provide better information to investors to make investment decisions. The pure quantitative
approach combine the information contained in the low frequency macroeconomic data which provide a
long-term through-the-cycle credit evaluation and the timeless market cognition of the risk of investing
in the country. The credibility factor grants higher weight to market implied rating when the market is
facing turmoil and less weight when the market is stable. We believe the quantitative adjustment from
market implied rating is more objective than the qualitative adjustment implemented by rating agencies,
and therefore provide better ratings to investors. Accordingly, the δ−rating can correct the subjective
biases of agencies’ ratings and offer better information to investors to make their investment decision.
This statement is even more important, as to optimize a portfolio allocation considering the financial
assets issued by the fast growing emerging countries, a more reactive analysis is required.
Furthermore, having used a data set from 2001 to 2012 which covers the turmoil period of the recent
European Sovereign-Debt Crisis, our results show that CRAs cannot justify themselves by claiming that
they focus on a long-term horizon in using a through-the-cycle rating methodology. Their ratings seems
distorted by certain subjective decisions which may be questionable. The statement that they aim to
respond only to the perceived permanent component of credit-quality changes is suspect as well since
they gives the ratings to Italy, Portugal and Spain lower than the ratings implied by their economic
and market indicators. The debt problem experienced by the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain)
justify the concerns, but the pressures from public opinions seems aggravating their predicaments. It is
interesting noticing that according to CRAs the PIGS are not investment grade while considering our
analysis they are. Consequently, from a credit point of view, the PIGS are ranked among emerging
economies. Relying on CRAs may lead to arbitrage opportunities as the yield of bonds issued by the new
pool of emerging countries (i.e. PIGS and traditional emerging countries) are too high considering the
inherent risk highlighted by our study, therefore, it could be very interesting to invest in these countries,
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as the bonds are under-priced according to our analysis. The crisis of these sovereigns, however, could be
chances for investors, since hidden opportunities during crises discovered and highlighted by alternative
risk evaluation may be the way to the success. Emerging Markets today will become tomorrow’ developed
countries. From a credit point of view, without considering any political aspects, these changes may come
faster than expected. Besides, considering that some developed countries may do a backward journey
toward uncertainty, the definition of emerging countries should be revised, and should be disconnected
to the definition underlying investment/ non-investment grade assets.
These results stimulate further interests in studies. Firstly, we have not discussed the problem of forward
looking ratings which could be achieved by a quantitative analysis. Since the macroeconomic forecasts for
the coming five years from are available from worldwide banks and IMF, we are able to derive a forward
looking perspective of country-specific implied ratings. Difficulty may arise from forecasting the market
information. Secondly, the correlations between the ratings and the loss given defaults have not been
dealt with. We believe these ratings combined practitioners’ expectations of the two important factors of
counterpart risk. It could be interesting to study the implied default probability and loss given defaults
using public available information which is more practicable for investors and risk managers.
Lastly, our studies is limited by the availability of market data for emerging markets. The study will
be extended considering a larger group of emerging countries when there are more resourceful data for
emerging markets. Furthermore, as some non-linearity in both the fundamental and the market implied
models’ factors, it will be interesting to extend the methodology to non-linear approaches.
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Advanced Economies
GDP PCI Inf. FB ED CAB CPI Score
GDP 1.00 -0.09 0.11 -0.25 -0.15 0.23 0.18 0.13
PCI -0.09 1.00 -0.14 0.29 -0.02 0.46 0.44 0.41
Inf. 0.11 -0.14 1.00 -0.09 -0.11 -0.29 -0.12 -0.13
FB -0.25 0.29 -0.09 1.00 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.02
ED -0.15 -0.02 -0.11 -0.05 1.00 0.19 -0.30 -0.23
CAB 0.23 0.46 -0.29 0.08 0.19 1.00 0.48 0.33
CPI 0.18 0.44 -0.12 0.01 -0.30 0.48 1.00 0.69
Score 0.13 0.41 -0.13 0.02 -0.23 0.33 0.69 1.00
VIF 1.29 1.57 1.14 1.20 1.53 2.32 1.91
Emerging Economies
GDP PCI Inf. FB ED CAB CPI Score
GDP 1.00 -0.36 0.08 -0.30 0.02 0.09 -0.32 -0.12
PCI -0.36 1.00 -0.11 0.81 -0.15 -0.29 0.52 0.41
Inf. 0.08 -0.11 1.00 0.16 -0.20 0.30 -0.22 -0.45
FB -0.30 0.81 0.16 1.00 -0.09 -0.21 0.50 0.23
ED 0.02 -0.15 -0.20 -0.09 1.00 -0.34 0.20 -0.37
CAB 0.09 -0.29 0.30 -0.21 -0.34 1.00 -0.73 -0.46
CPI -0.32 0.52 -0.22 0.50 0.20 -0.73 1.00 0.54
Score -0.12 0.41 -0.45 0.23 -0.37 -0.46 0.54 1.00
VIF 1.23 3.84 1.38 3.89 1.28 2.60 3.21
All Sovereigns
GDP PCI Inf. FB ED CAB CPI Score
GDP 1.00 -0.35 0.30 -0.41 -0.16 0.12 -0.28 -0.32
PCI -0.35 1.00 -0.50 0.56 0.11 0.37 0.77 0.75
Inf. 0.30 -0.50 1.00 -0.29 -0.20 -0.10 -0.56 -0.66
FB -0.41 0.56 -0.29 1.00 0.04 0.08 0.48 0.50
ED -0.16 0.11 -0.20 0.04 1.00 0.12 0.02 0.02
CAB 0.12 0.37 -0.10 0.08 0.12 1.00 0.29 0.16
CPI -0.28 0.77 -0.56 0.48 0.02 0.29 1.00 0.88
Score -0.32 0.75 -0.66 0.50 0.02 0.16 0.88 1.00
VIF 1.38 3.26 1.63 1.63 1.13 1.37 2.95
*
PCI is per capita income; Inf. means inflation; FB refers to fiscal balance; ED indicates external debt; CAB is the abbreviation
of current account balance; CPI is the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International; DH denotes
default history; Score is the numerical value of the corresponding rating. The correlations are computed for all the sovereigns,
advanced economies and emerging economies and listed in the three sub-tables.
Table 6: Correlation among Economic Indicators and Rating Scores (2001-2012)
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Importance of components:
All Economies
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
Standard deviation 1.9281 1.0897 1.0377 0.8948 0.71550 0.62213 0.46419 0.3213
Proportion of Variance 0.4647 0.1484 0.1346 0.1001 0.06399 0.04838 0.02693 0.0129
Cumulative Proportion 0.4647 0.6131 0.7477 0.8478 0.91178 0.96017 0.98710 1.0000
Advanced Economies
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
Standard deviation 1.5973 1.2271 1.1086 0.9247 0.86485 0.68678 0.63403 0.48714
Proportion of Variance 0.3189 0.1882 0.1536 0.1069 0.09349 0.05896 0.05025 0.02966
Cumulative Proportion 0.3189 0.5071 0.6607 0.7676 0.86113 0.92009 0.97034 1.00000
Emerging Economies
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8
Standard deviation 1.7672 1.2814 1.1289 0.9353 0.7818 0.46764 0.37059 0.34435
Proportion of Variance 0.3904 0.2053 0.1593 0.1094 0.0764 0.02734 0.01717 0.01482
Cumulative Proportion 0.3904 0.5956 0.7549 0.8643 0.9407 0.96801 0.98518 1.00000
This table gives the principle component analysis results of the economic indicators listed in Table 1 with the three sample sets.
Here PC1 to PC8 refers to Rating Scores, GDP growth rate, Per capita income, inflation rate, fiscal balance, external debts,
current balance accounts, and corruption perceptions index.
Table 7: Principle Component Analysis of Economic Indicators (2001-2012)
GDP PCI* Inf.* FB* ED* CAB* CPI* DH* Score* Rating
Advanced Economies
Min -8.3540 6270 -0.903 18.01 9.709 -12.638 3.700 0.0 49.00 AA-/stable
1st Qu 0.7505 27146 1.575 36.47 42.511 -3.201 7.100 0.0 99.00 –
Median 1.9195 37293 2.184 43.58 58.422 1.012 8.500 0.5 100.00 –
Mean 1.7465 38335 2.180 42.60 60.735 1.847 7.921 0.5 96.72 –
3rd Qu. 3.0595 46329 2.784 49.59 77.138 5.788 9.000 1.0 100.00 –
Max. 14.7630 99665 6.612 58.53 123.357 25.813 9.900 1.0 100.00 AAA/stable
Emerging Economies
Min. -7.800 467.2 -0.846 17.00 7.876 -8.4270 2.300 1 26.0 BBB-/negative
1st Qu. 2.851 2118.7 3.703 20.28 40.096 -3.3453 2.700 1 54.0 –
Median 4.325 5080.5 4.944 31.84 50.806 -0.2730 3.500 1 62.5 –
Mean 4.194 5861.7 5.871 30.27 51.529 -0.1983 3.652 1 61.8 –
3rd Qu. 6.118 8768.7 7.099 38.58 66.929 2.8727 4.525 1 74.0 –
Max. 10.623 15354.3 21.461 52.40 84.300 11.0690 5.500 1 80.0 A/stable
All Countries
Min. -8.3540 467.2 -0.903 17.00 7.876 -12.638 2.300 0.0000 26.00 BBB-/negative
1st Qu. 0.9423 11248.1 1.780 33.78 41.700 -3.248 4.600 0.0000 75.00 –
Median 2.5165 30152.8 2.479 39.34 55.836 0.285 7.300 1.0000 100.00 –
Mean 2.4459 29056.8 3.234 39.08 58.105 1.262 6.701 0.6429 86.75 –
3rd Qu. 3.9000 43394.7 3.814 47.68 72.164 4.697 8.800 1.0000 100.00 –
Max. 14.7630 99664.5 21.461 58.53 123.357 25.813 9.900 1.0000 100.00 AAA/stable
*
In this table, PCI is the per capita income; Inf. means inflation; FB refers to fiscal balance; ED indicates external debt; CAB
is the abbreviation of current account balance; CPI is the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International;
DH denotes default history; Score is the numerical value of the corresponding rating. It includes 20 advanced economies: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singa-
pore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States; and 8 emerging economies: Brazil, Hungary, India, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, South Africa and Thailand. The data is from 2001 to 2012, annually.
Table 8: Statistics of Economic Indicator Data (2001-2012)
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Fixed vs. OLS Fixed or Random Time-fixed Random or OLS Cross-sectional Serial Correlation
F Test Hausman Test F Test
Breusch-Pagan Breusch-Pagan Breusch-Godfrey/
LM Test LM Test Wooldridge Test
F=9.61 chisq=37.35 F=1.22 chisq=69.41 chisq=605.93 chisq=69.93
Advanced df1=18 df=7 df1=11 df=1 df=190 df=12
Economies df2=213 p-value= df2=202 p-value< p-value< p-value=
p-value<2.2e-16 4.03e-06 p-value=0.28 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 3.3e-10
F=20.81 chisq=3.43 F=1.33 chisq=159.34 chisq= 65.84 chisq=40.20
Emerging df1=7 df=6 df1=11 df=1 df=28 df=12
Economies df2=81 p-value= df2=70 p-value< p-value= p-value=
p-value<9.44e-16 1.83e-11 p-value=0.23 2.2e-16 6.95e-05 6.66e-05
F=26.75 chisq=97.18 F=1.64 chisq= 468.72 chisq=1137.98 chisq=143.84
All df1=26 df=7 df1=11 df=1 df=378 df=12
Countries df2=301 p-value¡ df2=290 p-value< p-value< p-value<
p-value<2.2e-16 2.2e-16 p-value=0.09 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 2.2e-16
* Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier method tests the pooling regression vs. random effect; The Hausman Test checks the fixed
effect vs. the random effect. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test checks the cross-sectional effect. The time-fixed effect is
tested using an F -test and the serial correlation is tested using the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test. All the tests are
implemented on the entire data set, the advanced economies and the emerging countries.
Table 9: Tests for Regression Method of Country-Specific Model
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max Std. Highest Rating Lowest Rating
1 Australia 2.73 5.21 5.51 5.39 5.81 6.79 0.70 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
2 Austria 1.87 3.50 4.02 3.96 4.42 5.47 0.74 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
3 Belgium 2.47 3.71 4.14 4.13 4.46 5.88 0.61 AA+/Stable AA-/Stable
4 Canada 1.58 3.37 4.11 4.00 4.74 5.97 1.01 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
5 Czech 2.29 3.77 4.22 4.38 4.85 7.27 0.91 AA-/Positive A/Stable
6 Denmark 0.97 3.35 3.97 3.83 4.48 5.51 0.98 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
7 Finland 1.34 3.36 3.95 3.85 4.39 5.48 0.85 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
8 France 2.06 3.46 3.94 3.91 4.36 5.35 0.69 AAA/Stable AAA/Negative
9 Germany 1.16 3.19 3.85 3.67 4.28 5.28 0.90 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
10 Italy 3.21 4.08 4.43 4.55 4.92 7.30 0.68 AA/Stable A-/Negative
11 Netherlands 1.54 3.39 3.93 3.84 4.36 5.40 0.82 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
12 New Zealand 3.24 5.66 5.94 5.79 6.24 7.03 0.76 AAA/Stable AA+/Stable
13 Norway 1.61 3.69 4.24 4.37 4.96 6.97 1.17 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
14 Portugal 3.10 4.07 4.46 5.39 5.24 17.36 2.50 AA/Stable BB-/Negative
15 Singapore 1.30 2.37 2.86 2.82 3.38 4.13 0.68 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
16 Spain 3.00 3.96 4.27 4.46 5.02 7.64 0.75 AAA/Stable BBB/Negative
17 Sweden 1.13 3.20 3.87 3.80 4.59 5.77 1.05 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
18 Switzerland 0.45 1.97 2.44 2.36 2.86 3.73 0.74 AAA/Stable AAA/Stable
19 United Kingdom 1.44 3.69 4.49 4.18 4.84 5.58 0.92 AAA/Stable AAA/Negative
20 United States 1.39 3.40 4.07 3.90 4.60 5.51 0.95 AAA/Stable AAA/Negative
1 Brazil 2.26 5.10 6.38 8.19 10.44 30.78 4.76 BBB/Stable B+/Negative
2 India 4.96 6.92 7.62 7.50 8.15 10.82 1.15 A+/Stable BBB-/Negative
3 Hungary 5.49 7.04 7.54 7.72 8.22 12.72 1.00 BBB-/Stable BB+/Stable
4 Philippine 4.85 7.23 8.75 9.84 12.48 18.64 3.16 BBB/Stable BB+/Negative
5 Poland 4.39 5.50 5.90 6.37 6.47 12.54 1.57 A+/Stable A/Stable
6 Russia 6.26 6.84 7.91 8.36 9.43 18.90 1.90 BBB+/Stable B-
7 South Africa 6.44 8.06 8.67 9.07 9.80 13.50 1.39 A/Positive BBB+/Stable
8 Thailand 2.35 3.73 4.42 4.42 5.07 6.84 0.88 A/Stable BBB+/Stable
*There are statistics of 20 advanced economies and 8 emerging economies government benchmark bond yields with 10 years maturity.
1st Qu. and 3rd Qu. means the first quartile and third quartile; Std. refers to the standard error. The data set starts from Jan.
2001 to Sep. 2012. We give the highest rating and lowest rating from Fitch History Rating during this period in the last two
columns. For the lack of data, the statistics of Philippine and Russia start from 16/01/2001 and 21/03/2003 respectively.
Table 10: Statistics of Government Benchmarks 10 Year Bond Yields of 28 Countries (2001-2012)
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Ask-Bid Spreads FTSE Global Market CAP
Min Median Mean Max Std Min Median Mean Max Std
1 Australia 0.99 1.09 1.10 1.32 0.04 20.42 61.88 63.07 111.28 27.34
2 Austria 0.61 1.02 0.99 1.12 0.08 0.75 3.40 3.61 8.90 2.12
3 Belgium 0.31 1.01 0.94 1.08 0.15 3.59 7.83 8.04 12.11 1.86
4 Canada 0.87 1.07 1.08 1.24 0.05 26.92 78.68 74.44 134.39 28.98
5 Czech 0.78 1.00 1.02 1.42 0.13 0.17 1.41 1.24 3.24 0.77
6 Denmark 0.97 1.08 1.09 1.54 0.08 3.80 8.55 9.17 16.29 3.29
7 Finland 0.84 1.03 1.03 1.27 0.04 6.58 11.75 12.62 26.39 3.85
8 France 0.62 1.03 1.00 1.12 0.08 46.85 100.92 104.75 179.16 31.70
9 Germany 1.02 1.07 1.09 1.39 0.90 28.60 75.69 76.89 138.34 24.65
10 Italy 0.06 0.99 0.86 1.04 0.24 19.24 35.54 38.37 65.67 12.21
11 Netherland 0.84 1.03 1.03 1.15 0.04 15.80 35.90 36.31 57.24 8.77
12 New Zealand 0.92 1.09 1.08 1.22 0.06 0.79 1.63 1.63 2.55 0.42
13 Norway 1.02 1.12 1.15 1.60 0.11 2.58 7.52 7.61 16.34 3.58
14 Portugal 0.00 1.01 0.82 1.06 0.35 1.88 3.52 3.76 6.87 1.10
15 Singapore 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.18 0.01 4.14 10.13 12.10 23.00 5.66
16 Spain 0.04 1.02 0.89 1.09 0.27 16.35 39.96 39.71 73.11 14.21
17 Sweden 0.75 1.01 1.00 1.24 0.03 9.39 25.73 25.44 43.04 8.43
18 Switzerland 1.00 1.14 1.17 1.69 0.10 34.96 72.44 70.89 101.92 17.67
19 United Kingdom 0.94 1.08 1.08 1.28 0.04 118.8 224.4 225.0 345.1 48.68
20 United States 0.95 1.10 1.10 1.22 0.04 642.3 1142.8 1131.3 1513.1 196.30
1 Brazil 1.16 1.72 1.74 2.13 0.16 3.12 27.15 32.04 75.75 23.44
2 India 2.72 2.72 2.72 2.72 5.70E-07 3.68 27.23 24.63 46.10 12.06
3 Hungary 0.69 0.96 0.95 1.16 0.08 0.36 1.65 1.65 3.60 0.82
4 Philippine 0.38 0.73 0.73 1.08 0.16 0.34 1.00 1.16 3.38 0.73
5 Poland 0.72 0.98 0.96 1.13 0.06 0.64 2.68 2.78 6.44 1.65
6 Russia 0.49 1.23 1.23 1.80 0.15 2.59 20.10 17.66 40.29 10.35
7 South Africa 0.91 1.00 1.01 1.15 0.04 4.41 22.34 20.89 38.52 10.21
8 Thailand 0.61 0.99 1.00 1.50 0.13 0.59 3.30 3.53 8.86 2.12
*Market capitalizations of the country’s equity market issued by FTSE-Global Equity Index for each sovereign are normalized
into the common scale as bond yields and liquidity spreads. Statistics of two market indicators of the 28 economies. The Bid-Ask
spread is calculated using the following formula: Ask−BidAsk × 100% using data collected from Bloomberg. The equity market
capitalizations of sovereign is measured by the FTSE-Global market cap index. Std means standard deviation. These data start
from Jan. 2001 to Sep. 2012. The data of Philippine and Russia follow the same period as the data of their government
benchmark bond yields. They are all daily data.
Table 11: Statistics of Market Indicators (2001-2012)
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Country-Specific Rank Market Implied Rank Rank Splits
Advanced Economies
Australia 17 19 2
Austria 5 7 2
Belgium 6 10 4
Canada 8 12 4
Czech Republic 20 14 -6
Denmark 12 9 -3
Finland 14 5 -9
France 2 8 6
Germany 4 4 0
Italy 7 13 6
Netherlands 9 6 -3
New Zealand 18 20 2
Norway 3 17 14
Portugal 19 16 -3
Singapore 1 2 1
Spain 16 11 -5
Sweden 11 3 -8
Switzerland 10 1 -9
United Kingdom 15 15 0
United States 13 18 5
Emerging Economies
Brazil 7 7 0
Hungary 3 3 0
India 4 2 -2
Philippines 5 6 1
Poland 2 4 2
Russia 6 8 2
South Africa 8 5 -3
Thailand 1 1 0
In this table, the implied credit ranks of the 20 advanced economies and the 8 selected emerging economies have been provided.
The number in the first column is the country-specific ranks computed from the results of Table 2. The market implied ranks are
listed in the second column calculated from the implied credit premium in Table 3 and 4. In the last column, the differences
between the two ranks have been provided.
Table 12: Country-Specific Implied and Market Implied Ranks
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Country Fundamental Score Market Score Averaged Scores Fitch’s Score δ−Socre Weight
Australia 0.83 0.82 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.311901195
Austria 0.97 0.87 0.92 1.00 0.97 0.039688222
Belgium 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.003523232
Canada 0.96 0.86 0.91 1.00 0.95 0.056833804
Czech Republic 0.76 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.76 0.007325898
Denmark 0.94 0.87 0.91 1.00 0.94 0.050539811
Finland 0.93 0.87 0.90 1.00 0.93 0.057606644
France 0.99 0.87 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.023910266
Germany 0.98 0.89 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.019197356
Italy 0.96 0.85 0.90 0.69 0.90 0.529180125
Netherlands 0.95 0.87 0.91 1.00 0.95 0.044894827
New Zealand 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.95 0.82 0.122773553
Norway 0.98 0.83 0.91 1.00 0.97 0.104713107
Portugal 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.49 0.83 0.851728728
Singapore 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.23082E-06
Spain 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.59 0.86 0.736500433
Sweden 0.94 0.89 0.92 1.00 0.94 0.028099158
Switzerland 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.00088457
United Kingdom 0.91 0.84 0.88 0.99 0.91 0.091735941
United States 0.94 0.83 0.89 0.99 0.93 0.095308758
Brazil 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.002671929
Hungary 0.68 0.7 0.69 0.54 0.69 0.626134691
India 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.54 0.69 0.644876707
Philippines 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.55 0.62 0.113775216
Poland 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.75 0.68 0.027353724
Russia 0.52 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.52 0.051003205
South Africa 0.66 0.61 0.64 0.74 0.65 0.276121817
Thailand 0.74 0.86 0.80 0.70 0.76 0.159453856
*
The advanced and emerging economies are listed in the first column separated by a horizontal line. The upper 20 countries are
the advanced economies considered in our study and the lower 8 countries are the emerging countries. Fundamental credit scores
and market credit scores are given in the second and the third column. The Fitch’s scores are the score obtained from Fitch’s rating
using the mapping given in Table 14. Weights are the credibility weights (ω in Equation (4)) computed by 2
2+σ
2
τ2
. The δ−score
listed in the last column are the weighted averaged scores of fundamental and market credit score using the credibility weights.
Table 13: Fundamental and Market implied Ratings Scores
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1 AAA Stable 0.67 BBB+ Watch Positive 0.34 B+ Negative
0.99 AAA Negative 0.66 BBB+ Positive 0.33 B+ Watch Negative
0.98 AAA Watch Negative 0.65 BBB+ Stable 0.32 B Watch Positive
0.97 AA+ Watch Positive 0.64 BBB+ Negative 0.31 B Positive
0.96 AA+ Positive 0.63 BBB+ Watch Negative 0.3 B Stable
0.95 AA+ Stable 0.62 BBB Watch Positive 0.29 B Negative
0.94 AA+ Negative 0.61 BBB Positive 0.28 B Watch Negative
0.93 AA+ Watch Negative 0.6 BBB Stable 0.27 B- Watch Positive
0.92 AA Watch Positive 0.59 BBB Negative 0.26 B- Positive
0.91 AA Positive 0.58 BBB Watch Negative 0.25 B- Stable
0.9 AA Stable 0.57 BBB- Watch Positive 0.24 B- Negative
0.89 AA Negative 0.56 BBB- Positive 0.23 B- Watch Negative
0.88 AA Watch Negative 0.55 BBB- Stable 0.22 CCC Watch Positive
0.87 AA- Watch Positive 0.54 BBB- Negative 0.21 CCC Positive
0.86 AA- Positive 0.53 BBB- Watch Negative 0.2 CCC Stable
0.85 AA- Stable 0.52 BB+ Watch Positive 0.19 CCC Negative
0.84 AA- Negative 0.51 BB+ Positive 0.18 CCC Watch Negative
0.83 AA- Watch Negative 0.5 BB+ Stable 0.17 CC Watch Positive
0.82 A+ Watch Positive 0.49 BB+ Negative 0.16 CC Positive
0.81 A+ Positive 0.48 BB+ Watch Negative 0.15 CC Stable
0.8 A+ Stable 0.47 BB Watch Positive 0.14 CC Negative
0.79 A+ Negative 0.46 BB Positive 0.13 CC Watch Negative
0.78 A+ Watch Negative 0.45 BB Stable 0.12 C Watch Positive
0.77 A Watch Positive 0.44 BB Negative 0.11 C Positive
0.76 A Positive 0.43 BB Watch Negative 0.1 C Stable
0.75 A Stable 0.42 BB- Watch Positive 0.09 C Negative
0.74 A Negative 0.41 BB- Positive 0.08 C Watch Negative
0.73 A Watch Negative 0.4 BB- Stable 0.07 D Watch Positive
0.72 A- Watch Positive 0.39 BB- Negative 0.06 D Positive
0.71 A- Positive 0.38 BB- Watch Negative 0.05 D Stable
0.7 A- Stable 0.37 B+ Watch Positive 0.04 D Negative
0.69 A- Negative 0.36 B+ Positive 0.03 D Watch Negative
0.68 A- Watch Negative 0.35 B+ Stable
*
This table shows the mapping from numerical credit score between 0 to 1 to the standard alphabets ratings from D watch
negative to AAA stable.
Table 14: Ratings and Corresponding Scores
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*
This figure presents the economic indicators exhibited in Table 1 except for the two dummy variable (economic development and
default history) and the rating scores. The upper, medium and lower plots are respectively, the score plots of the variables of all
the sovereigns, the advanced economies and the emerging economies.
Figure 1: Score Plot of Economic Indicators
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*These eleven countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherland, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and
Switzerland, are the countries which has had a AAA/Stable rating during the whole period from 2001 to 2012..
Figure 2: Government Benchmarks 10 Year Bond Yields of the Advanced AAA/Stable Rated Countries
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*These nine countries: Belgium, Czech, France, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States are the
countries in the advanced economies group which have been downgraded during the sample period.
Figure 3: Government Benchmarks 10 Year Bond Yields of the Downgraded Advanced Countries
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*These eight countries are the emerging economies in the sample. The data of Brazil, India, Hungary, Poland, South Africa and
Thailand start from 01/01/2001 to 30/09/2012. The data of Philippine start from 16/01/2001 and end at 30/09/2012. The data
of Russia start at 21/03/2003 and end at 30/09/2012.
Figure 4: Government Benchmarks 10 Year Bond Yields of the Emerging Countries
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The upper graph illustrates the movement of the VIX index during the sample period. The lower graph plots the times series of
Brazil bond yields and VIX.
Figure 5: 10 Year Government Bond Yields of Brazil with rating announcements and VIX Index
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